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MANAGEMENT IN CREW RESOURCE M4NAGEMENT EDUCATION

William G. Rantz
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the science of applied behavior analysis and its potential integration into current research and
practice of threat and error management for internal crew behaviors. Discussions provide insight into how an
Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence (ABC) analysis of behavior can reveal to educators, the antecedents and
consequences for at-risk crew behavior. This paper will redefine crew at-risk behaviors as anti-error behaviors that
prevent internal error occurrence. This new perspective will complement and enhance the total threat-error process
model. Finally the challenges and implications of using crew reinforcement to maintain anti-error behavior using
modified lineoriented flight training (LOFT)will be discussed.
Mat is Applied Behavior Analysis?
Behavior analysis is not new to the field of psychology,
however using behavior analysis within the field of aviation
psychology, as evidenced in the literature, appears to be a
novel approach whose time may be approaching. Some
researchers (e.g., Rantz, Olson, & Dickinson, 2001) are
using new applications of behavior analysis to provide
improvements to student landing performance in a flight
training environment. "Despite the obvious relevance of
this simple behavioral formulation to the understanding of
kctors such as motivation, the effects of incentives and
deterrents and the e£fkcts of past experience on future
behavior, virtually no systematic attention has been paid to
it by aviation psychologists" (Fuller, 1994, p. 174).
"Behavior analysis, far from representing an alternativeto
cognitive theory, may be regarded as complementaryto it"
(Fuller, 1994, p. 187). Behavior analysis is the scientific
study of how environmental events cause changes in
observable behaviors. While behavior analytic theory is
regularly applied to private behavior (e-g., thoughts and
feelings) when applicable, this paper will emphasize
behavior analysis applied to the pilot's environment and
hidher observable behavior.
Brethower (2000) provides a pragmatic overview of the
behavior analysis of instruction in the following statement:
Behaviorists say that, at any moment in time, what a
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person brings to a specific situation is fixed. Whatever
the person's intelligence is, whatever the person's
personality is, whatever the person's goals and dreams
are, they are what they are. What we can manipulate or
change to improve performance is some part of the
environment. Behavior analysts begin by asking this
sort of question: 'What aspect of this environment can
we change to improve this performance? We aren't
talking about broad-brush issues as changinginner-city
neighborhoods, we are talking about specific changes
such as altering the frequency of feedback or the
rewards or the instruction. (p. 432)
Applied behavior analysis implicates the importance of
scientificallycollecting data regarding observablebehavior
because observed behavior itself is valuable (Miller,
1997). One aspect of behavior analysis used in
IndustriaVOrganizationalpsychology is to teach individuals
how to implement performance management and
performance improvement techniques in the work place
and evaluate their efkctiveness (Daniels, 1989). Behavior
analysis strategies typically employ objective measures of
work performance, goal setting, performance feedback, and
positive reinforcement. Evaluation strategies based on the
on-going analysis of work performance over time allow
individuals to make database management decisions about
new and existing performance management systems.
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This notion of behavior observation, data collection, and
the on-going analysis of crew performance corresponds to
the work of the crew resource management (CRM)
researchers at the University of Texas at Austin (UTAustin), led by Dr. Robert Helmreich. "Effective CRM
programs are data driven, using information fkom surveys,
observations ofnormal operations, and detailed analyses of
errors, accidents, and incidents. Effective programs are
both specific and practical. They deal with observable
behaviors and eschew vague generalities and what is often
called 'psychobabble"' (Helmreich, 2000, p. 2).
Current Threat-Error hfanagement
Threat-error management awareness and practicing
behaviors that detect errors are important components of
human factors training. The practice of error management
assumes the traditional elements of safkty including, rules,
safety training, and safety culture preexist in the
appropriategovernmental agency, employer organization,
training department, and individual. These traditional and
vitally important elements areused as layered safety shields
to stop errors before becoming accidents (Reason,1997).
The current error management troika consists of avoidance
of the error, trapping incipient errors before they are
committed, and mitigating the consequences of errors that
occur and are not trapped (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm,
1999). Currently the UT-Austin model of threat and flight
crew error management consists of four levels. These
include; external threats (expected or unexpected events
and risks including external errors), internal threats (crewbased errors), crew action (CRM behaviors or error
detection and appropriate response behaviors), and
outcomes (a safer flight, recovery to a safer flight,
additional error, or a crew-based accidentlincident).
There are five potential error types within each level of
the model. The first is identified as intentional
noncompliance errors (conscious violations of Standard
Operating Procedures [SOPS]). The second is procedural
errors (mistakes in procedures). The third is
communication errors (errant internal or external verbal
behavior). The forth is proficiency errors (deficient
technical flight skills). The last error type is operational
decisionerrors(operationaldecision parameters outsidethe
SOPSand Federal Aviation Regulations [FARs]).
Helmreich, Klinect, and Wilhelm (1999) identified three
general crew behaviors related to errors: trap the error,
exacerbate the error, and fail to respond to the error.
Failing to respond to an error can not constitute an
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observable crew behavior and perhaps results in
exacerbating the error in the form of non-behavior. The
definition of error is deviation fiom accuracy or
correctness; a mistake, as in action or speech. This
definition defhlts to a reactive posture when managing
errors that occur during the flight.
Therefore, it is suggested that to reduce errors within
the flight environment and specificaljythe levels ofinternal
threats and crew actions, the boundaries of busbe shifted
forward, fiom the reactive behaviors of error management
to the behaviors that cause the errors. Or better yet,
identification of the behaviors, that if present, would avoid
or minimize error development. It is believed that with
training and reinforcement for appropriate,anti-error crew
behavior, errors occurring within these two levels can be
reduced significantly. How is it possible to improve safe
crew behavior before an internal or crew produced error
must be trapped or mitigated?
Shif Focus Upstream of the Error
It has been postulated in a reactive s
a
w triangle that
for every accident there will have been a larger number of
incidents and for every incident there will have been even
a larger number of errors, and for every error there will
have been a vast number of at-risk behaviors (Geller,
1988). Many safety programs in business and industry
focus on accident, incident, and errors when using
measurement data to report changes in progress resulting
fkom their safety initiatives. These programs fil to address
the root cause of safety violations, that is, the at-risk
behavior of the job perfbrmer. The key component to
control of any safety program is the control of the unsafe
behaviors that occur prior tothe error, incident, or accident.
Behavior-based safety interventions, founded on behavior
analysis, have been used for the past 20 years to reduce
accidents, incidents, and errors in the work environment by
decreasing at-risk behaviors and increasing safety related
Boettcher,
&
2000; Sulzerbehaviors (Grindle, Dickiison,
Azaroff & Austin, 2000).
The work of Seamester (Seamester, Prentiss, & Edens,
1997) examines the verbal behavior of crews to determine
which verbs are associated with improved CRM
performance. This particular research attempts to identify
more detailed observable CRM vocal behaviors (skills) for
assessment and integration across operations. In the line
operation safety audits (LOSA) conducted by the UTAustin team, many specific behaviors were identified as
evidence of error avoidance as well as error exacerbation
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(Helmreich, Wilhelrn, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001). Both
studies tend to emphasize the importance of particular
observable CRM behaviors that should increase measurable
performance output. The LOSA, among other things, is an
objective checklist of observable crew behavior. The verbal
behaviors that cause errors and avoid errors, identified by
the LOSA, are the types of behaviors that must be
pinpointed and used in the analysis of at-risk CRM
behavior. The identification of these particular verbal
behaviors will be the key to success. Verbal behavior can be
defined as "behavior of an individual that has been
reinforced through the mediahon of another person."
(Skinner, 1957, p.2). It is very likely that most anti-error
behavior will be verbal behavior of which specific vocal
behavior will be used in a specific environmental context.
However, the analysis should also include non-vocal
communicative behaviors, such as gesturing. Because the
consequences of behavior influence whether or not
behaviors occur again, this type of analysis should first
identi& the at-risk behavior of the consequences, which
sustain it. Then the appropriate anti-error behavior (verbal
or non-verbal) should be identified, and consequences
altered so the anti-error behavior will occur (or be
sustained), rather than the at-risk behavior. "Defining CRM
in terms of specific behaviors has been a trend toward
proceduralization of CRM, requiring interpersonal
behaviors and communications as part of technical
maneuvers. The positive side to this is clear guidance for

1

Antecedent
Glideslope interception

Components of an ABC Analysis
Behavior
I
Lower landing gear
I

The well-known performance management consultant,
Aubrey Daniels said, "Every behavior has a consequence.
In fact, behavior can be viewed as a h c t i o n of its
consequences. That is, consequences do not simply
influence what someone does; they control it. In order to
understand why people do what they do, instead of asking,
'Why did they do that?' ask, 'What happens to them when
they do that"' (Daniels 1989, p. 24). The key to finding a
good reinforcer is to look at what happens to the person
immediately after the behavior. Strong reinforcers are
positive (P), immediate (I), and certain (C) and when
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crews as to expected behaviors and, concurrently, the
ability to assess and reinforce their practice" (Helmreich et
al., 2001, p. 18).
The ABCs of CRM Flight Deck Behaviors
One key component of behavior analysis is the use of
an ABC analysis (Daniels, 1989; Krause, 1997). This
analysis consists of observing the crew's behavior within
the environment and identifjing the particular behaviors
of interest. "An ABC analysis entails identifling relevant
antecedents and consequences for behavior, where
antecedents are stimuli or conditions that precede
behavior and set the stage for or prompt it to occur; and
consequences are stimuli or enditions that follow a
behavior and change the probability that it will recur"
(Olson & Austin, 200 1, p. 2 1). Once the particular causal
error behaviors are identified, constructing an ABC
analysis using a three-term contingency diagram will
reveal which consequences within the environment are
reinforcing the error behavior. The analysis will also
identi@the critical antecedents that should prompt the
appropriate behavior, reducing "failure to respond"
errors.
Thus the ABC analysis, when complete, identifies the
(a) conditions under which the behavior should occur, (b)
the specific, observable anti-error behavior that should
occur, and (c) the consequences that result when the antierror behavior occurs.

-Consequence
See three green lights

1

presented after a behavior, maintain the current fiequency
of the behavior if it is at strength or increases the future
fiequency ofthe behavior. However, many consequences in
our environment are negative (N), delayed into the future
(F), and uncertain (U) (Daniels, 1989). Negative
consequencesmay punish an appropriatebehavior, delayed
positive consequences may reinforce an inappropriate
behavior that occurs in between the appropriate behavior
and the delayed consequence, and uncertain positive
consequencesmay not occur frequently enough to influence
an appropriate behavior. Additionally, delayed and
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improbable consequences are often hard to identify.
It has been mentioned that for the sake of increasing
operational efficiency, some violations such as intentional
non-compliance errors are made. Sixty two percent of the
total errors cited by the UT-Austin Team LOSA
observationsrevealed the crew's disregard in reading many
checklist items required during operation. These were
labeled as intentional non-compliance errors (Helmreich et

al., 2001). The error behavior was engaging in activity
other than the required reading ofthe checklist response of
the moment. An ABC analysis should reveal other
consequences present in the environment, which may be
reinforcing behavior other than reading the checklist or
may be punishing checklist reading behavior.

Undesired Behavior: Crew not reading the checklist
Antecedehts
Time to do other things
Other environmental stimuli distract attention
Seeing others not read checklist
Doesn't believe an incident will occur

Conseauences
Less of a work load (P), (I), (C)
Gets to attend other priority items (P), (I), (C)
Might get reprimanded 0,@, (U)
Might have an incident N,@I, N

Desired Behavior: Crew r e d fiom checklist
Antecedents
Threat of disciplinary action
Seeing others read checklist
Just had a near miss
Just came fiom training

Consequences
Might get praise (P), (I), (U)
Less time to attend other distracters (N), (I),(C)
Incident is unlikely over checklist items (P), (I), CU)
Must locate and find dace on checklist N,(11, (CI

Based on the ABC analysis, It would be prudent to reduce
or eliminate error behavior or distractions resulting in not
reading the checklist by reducing or eliminating the
reinforcers responsible for that behavior. In turn,it would
also be wise to increase the reinforcers for the anti-error
behavior of reading the checklist. Using our example of
crews not using the checklist we can analyze the
consequences of that particular at-risk behavior. It becomes
evident that the crew has some powerful positive,
immediate, and certain reinforcers present that support
behaviors other than reading the checklist and the negative
consequences are too uncertain and far in the future to
influence the current behavior. To establish the new antierror behavior of reading the checklist, new environmental
reinforcers must be made contingent upon it. Using the
ABC analysis can reveal the need to include more positive,
immediate, and certain reinforcers that are contingent
upon the desired checklist reading behavior. The
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consequences, in turn, will increase the future frequency of
that particular reading behavior. Detractions and
interruptions of checklist reading behavior are an accepted
f$ct of the operation. Airlines may wish to adopt specific
vocal responses provided by the crew, which will establish
an opening, "ReadyJorafer takeofcheck? "and a closing,
'YAfer takeofcheck complete. "to each checklist segment.
The contingent consequence to the final vocal response,
closing segment could be a simple, "Goodjob,thnk your'.
This would fulfil the (P), (I)
(C),
, requirement of a good
consequence. Therefore, intemrpted checklist reading
behavior should be followed by a continuation of the
segment and the closing consequenceexcluding any higher
threat items. A fiirther example of ABC analysis requires
CRM vocal behavior while encountering a potential threat
in the instrument environment.
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ABC Analysis of Anti-error CRM Verbal Behavior
Behavior
Consequence
Antecedent
Threat increme
ATC: Due to weather, hold at the
Alternative action envisioned and
regard to weather movement,
AZO VOR at 8,000. Expect
fiuther clearance 12502. Time
now 12102.
L
I at EFC.
I

This ABC analysis exhibits a potential threat increase
in the flight environment in the form of holding
instructions £tom ATC, which the crew recognizes. The
crew's response is to use one particular anti-error vocal
behavior to initiate a situational assessment. The results are
multiple consequences for this behavior in the form of
(C);
, agreement on the current
reducing the threat (P), (I)
state'and future course of action (P), (JJ, (C); and the
Captain's acknowledgement of good crew performance (P),
(I), (C). If pilots were trained in this process to understand
the importance of positive immediate and certain
consequences for appropriate behaviors many more antierror behaviors would occur on the flight deck. The process
to establish new contingencies of behavior on the flight
deck requires training, reinforcers, and feedback within the
educational environment and in line operations.
Implicationsfor Anti-error Reinforcement in CRM&LOFT
Education
"Keypersonnel responsible for training and evaluation
of performance need special training in the concepts and
assessment of threat and error management. It is essential
that error management be evaluated and reinfirced not only
in training but also in line operations. The major change
here is in formally recognizing that error, in itself, is part
of system operations and that effective error management
can represent effective crew performance" (Helmreich et
al., 2001, p. 21).
There are several essential points required to maximize
the educational resources needed to implement a behaviorbased threat-error model of training. The first point is
learning the principles of ABC analysis and understanding
what happens to people when they behave in a particular
way. This can be conducted in a classroom setting using
many everyday examples and role playing techniques. The
second point is to train this new behavior to fluency.
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Fluency is the term used for improving the accuracy and
rate ofbehaviors. Training to fluency is no stranger to skills
training in the aviation industry. This type of training is
usually a function of technical flight skills training and yet
is rarely used for CRM skills training. The same time used
for traditional, full mission line oriented flight training
&OFT) can be modified to adopt fluency training that
shapes anti-error verbal behaviors in simulated
environments. This type of training would shift the focus
fiom using full mission LOFT scenariosto developing and
evaluating CRM skills in a more frequent, shorter, and
varied LOFT vignettes. This shift of training exposure
would provide the crew with higher rates of practice and
feedback with regard to particular modules of anti-error
behaviors and in particular the contingent reinforcers and
performance outcomes of those behaviors. Once the crew
dem nstrated a variety of CRM skills, a 111mission nonjeopardy LOFT would be used to conclude the training.
Brethower and Smalley (1998) desaibe a performance
based instructional method that uses a systems approach to
training. This s y s t k develops the contingencies of
behavior, using a real-world approach, by providing guided
observations, guided practice and demonstration of
mastery. A new training system, based on this model, will
shift the focus upstream, fiom the errors to the anti-error
behaviors. This new proposed performance-based teaching
system will allow the flight crew to first experience
knowledge and rolaplay through guided observations fiom
the classroom, secondly to experience guided practice
during the LOFT vignettes and finally to demonstrate
mastery in a more traditional 111mission LOFT. Ensuring
the success and maintenance of the anti-error behaviors is
the final point. This may require a self-reporting, or intercrew reporting observation and non-jeopardy feedback
system of CRM performance. A simple system was used
with a roofing crew, which showed immediate and lasting
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changes in safety performance
(Austin, Kessler,
Riccobono, & Bailey, 1996). This type of system would
provide immediate, positive and certain reinforcers to the
flight crew with regard to their past performance and
reinforce the error avoidance behaviors shaped during
periodic recurrent training. A superb project management
technique that approaches the high level of crew behavior
observation and feedback is the Proficiency Assessment and
Training System (PATS) being used by Ansett Australia.
PATS uses an integration ofsimulator and line assessments
and safety related feedback data, which determine training
design needs. This intkated check and training system
uses crew behavior and performance outcome measures
during training and line checks to continually evaluate the
effectiveness of the company's training program and
pinpoint crewperformancesthat require additional training
(Henderson, 2000). To complement a PATS process, using
behavior analysis principles, would include a direct
feedback link not just to the training department but to the
crew during line checks. This proposed closed loop
observation-feedback system would build the positive,
immediate, and certain reinforcers required to establish
contingencies of appropriate crew behaviors and
performance. This could also include an on-going, nonjeopardy reward program that recognizes the "good"
performance of crewmembers.
There are seven essential elements that are required to
integrate a behavioral approach into flight operations. They
consist of the following:
1. Assess current LOSA data to pinpoint verbal and
nonverbal at-risk behaviors.
2. Identification of consequences supporting at-risk
behavior.
3. Replace observed at-risk behaviors with various antierror behaviors.
4. ModiG the standard operating procedures to include
appropriate consequences, which will sustain the various
anti-error behaviors.
5. Train crews in ABC analysis and inter-crew
observations.

6. Arrange for the crew to practice, through role-play,
various anti-error behavior and consequencecontingencies
in class using shortened LOFT vignettes.
7. Establish an objective inter-crew observation system
which provides anonymous, non-punitive, and timely
feedback of CRM behaviors to the crew and the training
department,
Summary
It would be incorrect to imply that using behavior
analysis and threat-error management affords pilots the
opportunity to believe they are error-fiee. This dangerously
assumes an "internalized" error-free attitude that a person
carries with them fiom one environment to another.
External environmental procedures, policies, technologies,
training, feedback, and behavioral contingencies are the
key elements to establish an error-reducing environment in
which the highly trained human interacts. Line operational
safety audits have shown that the current system oftraining
does not eliminate crew errors on the flight deck. Many
have said that errors can not be totally eliminated because
errors are simply a function of having a human within the
system. If this is so then we as scientists, psychologists, or
educators are obligated to examineall behavioral principles
that can provide evidence of performance change and use
those principles as a means to complement error reduction
methods already in existence. Behavior analysis, with its
scientifically validated behavioral principles, has great
potential to improve and balance the training initiatives of
the threat-error process model in CRM. Shifting the
intervention focus upstream fiom the error and targeting atrisk behavior gives the educator a proactive direction.
Identifying -the antecedents and arranging behaviorstrengthening consequences for anti-error behavior are the
key for developing and maintaining anti-error behaviors. A
vigorous, performance-based crew resource systems
program that identifies, shapes and reinforces the
appropriate anti-error behavior contingencies will provide
that ounce of prevention thereby avoiding that pound of
cure.O
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